I. INTRODUCTION
No one is surprised when a victorious political party gerrymanders district lines to benefit its own candidates. But the extreme impact that the practice can have still shocks many, particularly when a narrow gap between the number of votes cast for each party statewide produces an overwhelming legislative majority. 4 Are partisan gerrymanders 5 an ordinary component of the political process? Is there no shame in it? Or have politicians have become shameless? 6 Thirty years ago, the Court answered that question, holding that gerrymandering districts to favor one party discriminates against those who vote for the disadvantaged party, and thus violates the Equal Protection Clause. 7 But the Justices have struggled to agree on a test that courts could use to separate acceptable redistricting that may favor one party from unconstitutional gerrymanders that are designed to unfairly entrench one party's control of the legislature. 8 Although no one describes rigging a district map to give one political party an unfair partisan gerrymandering more narrowly to describe "only the pernicious and increasingly common type of aggressive gerrymander in which a party draws maps to maximize and lock in a disproportionately large share of seats." LAURA ROYDEN & MICHAEL LI, EXTREME MAPS 3 (2017); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 164 n.3 (1986) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged ed. 1961)) (defining gerrymandering as "to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts in an unnatural and unfair way with the purpose of giving one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as possible" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
6. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306-17 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Whether spoken with concern or pride, it is unfortunate that our legislators have reached the point of declaring that, when it comes to apportionment: 'We are in the business of rigging elections.'" (quoting Hoeffel, supra note 2)); Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (highlighting that an aide's presentation notes for a Republican caucus stated that "'[t]he maps we pass will determine who's here 10 years from now,' and '[w]e have an opportunity and an obligation to draw these maps that Republicans haven't had in decades'" (quoting Trial Exhibit 241 at 1, Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837 (No. 15-CV-421-BBC))), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2268 (2017) (mem.); Daggett v. Kimmelman, 535 F. Supp. 978, 982, 984 (D.N.J. 1982) (finding that a redistricting plan drafted by a neutral party "was rejected because it did not reflect the leadership's partisan concerns" and bemoaning that "the harshly partisan tone of Speaker Christopher Jackman's letter [rejecting the neutral plan] is disedifying, to say the least").
7. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (plurality opinion) (" [W] e hold that political gerrymandering cases are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause. We also concluded, however, that a threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution is required for a prima facie case of an equal protection violation.").
8. Id. at 118-85 (plurality opinion).
court struck down a state legislative district map as an unlawful partisan gerrymander 12 --the Supreme Court may finally be ready to adopt a test to determine when redistricting violates the Equal Protection Clause. 13 Perhaps surprisingly, the fundamental question--how bad is partisan gerrymandering--has received little attention.
14 For over a decade, the Supreme Court's decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer 15 has framed the debate. 16 There, a plurality of the Court concluded that "setting out to segregate [voters] by political affiliation is (so long as one doesn't go too far) lawful and hence ordinary," 17 and thus it is simply too difficult for a court to determine whether redistricting "is so substantially affected by the excess of an ordinary and lawful motive as to invalidate it."
18 Although extreme partisan gerrymandering, the 16. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281-301 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 297 (describing the relevant interest as "deprivation of that minimal degree of representation or influence to which a political group is constitutionally entitled"). Justice Stevens has repeatedly pointed out that administrable standards exist for identifying unconstitutional gerrymandering. Id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Thus, the problem . . . is not that there is no judicially manageable standard . . . but rather that the Judiciary lacks the ability to determine when a state legislature has violated its duty to govern impartially."); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This is a suit in which it is perfectly clear that judicially manageable standards enable us to decide the merits of a statewide challenge to a political gerrymander."); Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 950 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (" [T] he District Court's findings make clear that appellees could satisfy either the standard endorsed by the Court in its racial gerrymandering cass or that advocated in Justice Powell's dissent in Bandemer." (citing 478 U.S. at 173-85)).
17. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293. 18. Id. at 286; see also id. (" [Courts] are not justified in inferring a judicially enforceable constitutional obligation (the obligation not to apply too much partisanship in districting) which is both dubious and severely unmanageable."); id. at 297 ("How much political motivation and effect is too much?").
Justice Kennedy denied the Vieth plurality the critical fifth vote to render partisan gerrymandering claims non-justiciable. He saw the practice as a fundamental threat to our democratic traditions, and he argued that the courts should therefore adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims. 20 But, he recognized, the Justices had to agree on a "model of fair and effective representation" that would enable a court to "define clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a given partisan classification imposes on representational rights." 21 This Article shows that partisan gerrymanders are anathema to the ideal of American democracy. They produce precisely the type of unchecked decision-making that the Constitution sought to prevent. 22 And partisan gerrymandering clashes with the culture of American democracy that respects either (1) historical-boundary-based district voting or (2) proportionality between the percentage of voters who cast ballots for a party statewide and the percentage of representatives from that party in the legislature. Accepting partisan gerrymandering as a tolerable part of the political process would undermine the original understanding of a democratic republic embodied by the Constitution as well as the understandings of Americans throughout the nation's history.
This Article looks to that history and culture to articulate a standard for assessing redistricting claims. Courts have struggled to draw the line separating permissible and impermissible partisan gerrymandering because no such line exists. The Vieth plurality's framing-that a little partisanship is just fine, but too much is, well, too much 23 -finds no support in our constitutional, legal, or 19 . Id. at 281-301 (discussing partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence). 20. Id. at 307, 316-17 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 21. Id. at 307-08. 22 . See infra Section II.A. 23. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285-86 (distinguishing racial from political gerrymandering on the ground that the use of race in district line-drawing is always wrong, but the use of politics is not) ("Determining whether the shape of a particular district is so substantially affected by the presence of a rare and constitutionally suspect motive as to invalidate it is quite different from determining whether it is so democratic cultural history. The Court should not treat district linedrawing like the porridge in Goldilocks and the Three Bears: sometimes too hot or too cold, but somewhere in the middle is just right. The question here is one of kind, not degree: some types of district line-drawing accord with our heritage despite partisan effects, and some do not.
Legislators drawing a district map may take partisanship into account-just as they can take race into account 24 -to further a legitimate objective of the democratic process. 25 Our constitutional, legal, and democratic cultural history supports the two legitimate goals set out above-district mapping based on historical geographic boundaries or proportionality.
26
A partisan advantage may legitimately arise from pursuing one of these goals, because the goal substantially affected by the excess of an ordinary and lawful motive as to invalidate it."); id. at 291 (reasoning that fairness cannot be an administrable standard because non-contiguous districts and those that straddle subdivisions can be fair in some circumstances); id. at 293 ("A purpose to discriminate on the basis of race receives the strictest scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, while a similar purpose to discriminate on the basis of politics does not."). In Bandemer, Justice O'Connor identified political gerrymandering as distinct from racial gerrymandering because a racial minority group may be excluded from the political process by a dominant group, however, "members of the Democratic and Republican Parties . . . are the dominant groups, and the Court has offered no reason to believe that they are incapable of fending for themselves through the political process." 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
24. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion) ("Race can be used, for example, as an indicator to achieve the purpose of neighborhood cohesiveness in districting."); id. at 334 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The line that divides a racial or ethnic minority unevenly between school districts can be entirely legitimate if chosen on the basis of neutral factors-county lines, for example, or a natural boundary such as a river or major thoroughfare. But if the district lines were chosen for the purpose of limiting the number of minority students in the school, or the number of families holding unpopular religious or political views, that invidious purpose surely would invalidate the district."); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964-65 (1996) (plurality opinion) (holding that race may be considered in districting).
25. Cf. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("In the context of partisan gerrymandering . . . concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters' representational rights. . . . The inquiry is not whether political classifications were used. The inquiry instead is whether political classifications were used to burden a group's representational rights.").
26. See infra Part II.
comports with our democratic heritage. By contrast, drawing lines that disrespect both historical geographic boundaries and the proportional will of all voters-as partisan gerrymandering does-has no rational basis in our shared history, and thus it fails to accord voters on the short end of the partisan-gerrymander stick the equal protection of the law.
27
Gerrymandering at the expense of historic boundaries and proportionality-whether the lines drawn produce a small partisan advantage or a large one-is always illegitimate. 28 Modern computer software enables courts to analyze voting-district maps quickly to determine whether those maps objectively pursue either of the legitimate goals. When a map reveals disrespect for both goals and disproportionate results follow, a court should strike it down.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II reviews the history of voting law and culture in the United States, concluding that district line-drawing is constitutionally acceptable so long as it respects either (1) communities defined by historical geographic boundaries or (2) an apportionment that seeks proportionality between the percentage of voters statewide supporting a party and that party's percentage of representatives in the legislature. These goals embody policy choices that legislators should make without court interference. But American law and culture do not allow the entrenchment of one party in power via gerrymandering that ignores historical boundaries and the proportional will of the voters statewide. Part III reviews arguments that attempt to minimize the harm that partisan gerrymandering causes. It shows that each is unpersuasive and that gerrymandering improperly distorts the democratic process, undermining faith in the integrity of government. The threat to American democratic culture could not be graver, and courts should thus intervene. Part IV proposes an objective, administrable standard for proving a partisan gerrymandering case and an administrable remedy that would resolve cases quickly without enmeshing the courts in line-drawing exercises. Part V concludes by describing remedies courts could fashion to 27. This conclusion is true whether one looks to the original understanding of voting theory and practice embodied in the original meaning of the Constitution as understood by the founding generation or the evolution of that theory and practice that a living constitutionalist might take into account. Although the importance of majority politics shifted in American culture over time, support for geographically defined shared value communities persisted and never gave way to party politics.
28. See infra Section III.D.
provide relief when concluding that an electoral map fails the proposed test.
II. REDISTRICTING LAW & CULTURE
This Part reviews the Constitution, federal law, and American cultural attitudes toward partisan gerrymandering to reveal a relatively clear and consistent pattern. Since the Constitution's ratification, apportioning voters into districts that comport with historical community boundaries has been an acceptable districting method, even if the percentage of representatives from a party deviates from the percentage of votes that party received statewide. Throughout virtually every era in American history, however, some jurisdictions have apportioned voters to produce proportionality between statewide vote totals and the percentage of representatives in the legislature. Although proportionality has never been required, it has always been considered legitimate. By contrast, partisan effects obtained by disregarding both historical community boundaries and the proportional preferences of the state's voters have always been unacceptable.
Section A looks to the constitutional text and structure as well as early commentary and practice. Section B examines federal legislation, and Section C examines the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence. Section D then summarizes this part, rejecting the position that political considerations fall into a single category and that the only issue is whether they have gone too far. The history of federal law governing redistricting-as well as American cultural traditions surrounding voting-clearly distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate redistricting.
A. The Constitution and Early Commentary
The Constitution does not directly address intra-state apportionment or redistricting. But its structure is consistent with drawing districts that either (1) respect historical boundaries, such as those defining counties, cities, and towns, or (2) produce a percentage of representatives in each party consistent with the percentage of statewide votes cast for that party. Conversely, ignoring these goals to draw district lines ensuring the dominance of one political party finds no support in the Constitution's language or structure and conflicts with the cultural traditions identified with American democracy.
The constitutional analysis of gerrymandering starts with the Great Compromise, providing each state two Senators holding one legislative vote each. 29 On one level, the Compromise simply provided a path to an agreement; a way to enable the Union to form at all. 30 On another level, however, the two-Senator rule would not have made sense as a compromise unless the founding generation believed that historical geographic boundaries defined common-interest communities. 31 36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 56 (James Madison) ("Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either, which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison) ("The city of Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for the choice of federal representatives.").
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38
Madison's expectation that single-member districts would form within states, even though the Constitution did not compel them, aligns with the document's structure. Just as states' interests differed in meaningful ways that made the Great Compromise necessary to secure the states' agreement on a new form of government, areas within individual states would likely differ in meaningful ways that each state could take into account when drawing its district lines.
Although the Framers thus clearly approved of the use of singlemember geographic districts, nothing in the document or the surrounding commentary compelled the states to use them. Accordingly, some states did not adopt a single-member geographicdistrict system and instead held statewide at-large elections to select multiple representatives through a single vote. 39 Through the early 1840s, at least six states used this practice. 40 Although examples of partisan gerrymandering existed during the founding era, nothing in the language or structure of the Constitution supports the view that anyone considered it acceptable to manipulate district lines to favor a single party by disrespecting historical boundaries. On the contrary, the Framers designed the Constitution to guard against the precise effect that partisan gerrymandering is intended to produce: control of the law-making process by a single faction. 41 is] a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of structure established a culture of democracy favoring deliberation and compromise. 42 Partisan gerrymandering to produce a single dominant party capable of governing without check from the minority constitutes the antithesis of that culture.
The Framers also expected that candidates would be judged as individuals and did not anticipate the rise of the party system that has come to dominate American politics. 43 They would thus have had no reason to contemplate the possibility that districts could be drawn to ignore historical geographic boundaries and proportionality to instead favor unidentified future candidates simply based on a party affiliation.
This history shows that the founding generation understood the original meaning of the Constitution's language to permit either (1) separate elections in single-member districts defined by historical geographic boundaries or (2) at-large statewide elections reflecting the preference of the entire electorate.
B. Federal Law
With respect to the one specific sort of gerrymandering that the Framers anticipated, they built a provision into the Constitution to prevent it. The Framers required a census every ten years to prevent Congress from passively gerrymandering by ignoring population growth requiring reapportionment. 44 Beginning with the reapportionment act following the 1840 census, in the Apportionment Act of 1842, Congress began to regulate redistricting, invariably as a negative reaction to partisan gerrymandering. 45 It first required states to elect representatives "by interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."). 42. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (explaining that the system of dual sovereignty, the separate of departments within the federal government, and the size of the federal government all work together to ensure deliberation as opposed to dictatorial control by a single faction). 45. An Act for the Apportionment of Representatives Among the Several States According to the Sixth Census, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491 (1842). Vol. 48 districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the number of representatives to which said State may be entitled, no one district electing more than one Representative."
46 It took this step, Andrew Hacker has explained, to remedy what had become a "winner take all" process in some jurisdictions that excluded minority interests. 47 With the 1850 census, Congress abandoned the geographic district requirement. 48 In the 1860s, however, two significant developments occurred. First, the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing all citizens the equal protection of the laws. 49 Second, Congress reinitiated the geographic district rule and, over time, supplemented it with requirements that the districts should consist of "as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants" 50 and "compact territory." 51 Again, this federal intervention in House district linedrawing favored drawing new district lines that respected historic boundaries or proportionality between the statewide vote and the percentage of representatives in the legislature over partisan gerrymandering.
In could use alternative procedures to draw district lines other than assigning the task to the politicians who would run in those districts. 54 Again, partisan gerrymandering concerns appear to have been the motivating factor. For example, in supporting this change, Senator Burton viewed shifting redistricting away from the legislature as a positive move "[i]n view of the very serious evils arising from gerrymanders." 55 In 1920, the census reflected a large influx of immigrants into the northeastern states, particularly New York.
56
As a result, reapportionment would have radically shifted the composition of the House of Representatives. Congress responded with a passive gerrymander, refusing to redistrict at all. 57 Importantly, this gerrymandering was not viewed as ordinary or acceptable. On the contrary, Congress took steps to prevent it from happening again. In 1929, new legislation placed the redistricting process permanently in the hands of an administrative body and subjected apportionment to a mechanical formula that assigned a number of districts to each state based on the relative state populations.
58 "The need for legislation of this type," the legislative history of the 1929 reapportionment act explained, "is confessed by the record of the past nine years during which Congress has refused to translate the 1920 census into a new apportionment. . . . As a result, great American constituencies have been robbed of their rightful share of representation . . . ."
59 When Congress imposed this mechanical reapportionment system, it considered-but did not include-the earlier language relating to 54 . Id. at 2669 (holding that states could constitutionally use non-partisan commissions to redistrict rather than the state legislature in order to combat gerrymandering).
55 
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single-member districts, equal numbers, or compactness. 60 Once again, some states adopted at-large voting schemes. 61 These at-large systems continued until the 1960s, when Congress-again acting in the face of gerrymandering concerns-passed new reapportionment legislation. 62 This legislation, which remains in force today, requires single-member House districts.
63
Once again, Congress acted to combat state legislative efforts to ensure single-party dominance. In this case, it was concerned that southern states would move to multimember districts to combat the impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 64 This history confirms a constitutional openness to either (1) geographic districts drawn to respect historical boundaries, or (2) multimember districts respecting the relative proportion of voters favoring each party. Although it does not establish that partisan gerrymandering violated the original Constitution-as opposed to the post-Fourteenth Amendment version-it shows that gerrymandering conflicted with the culture of American democracy. Whenever Congress put a thumb on the redistricting scale, it invariably opposed gerrymandering to achieve single-party dominance. After Congress did away with the equal-population requirement that it imposed from the late 1800s through 1930, 65 some states engaged in passive gerrymanders. These failures to redraw district lines to reflect uneven population growth allowed large population disparities to grow between voting districts. 66 In 1964, the Supreme Court stepped in, holding that the Equal Protection Clause required fair redistricting, constitutionalizing the one-person, one-vote rule for all intra-state apportionment (House districts as well as state-election voting districts). 67 Although some commentators have questioned the constitutional underpinnings of applying the Equal Protection Clause to redistricting, 68 no Supreme Court Justice in over 40 years has argued that the one-person, one-vote rule should be overturned.
Opponents of adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims, however, have argued that the rule provides sufficient protection. 69 As long as a state apportions representation on a population basis, this argument runs, it is "obvious that nobody's vote has been 'diluted' in the sense in which that word was used" by the Court in adopting the 65 might well be that, designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. When this is demonstrated it will be time enough to consider whether the system still passes constitutional muster.").
recognized that the challenged boundaries improperly "maximized the political strength of rural voters and diluted the political power of urban voters." 75 And later, it emphasized that "[t]he very essence of districting is to produce a different-a more 'politically fair'-result than would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would take 100% of the legislative seats."
76 "An unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures, a mere nose count in the districts," Justice White explained for the Court, "may submerge . . . other [partisan gerrymandering] considerations and itself furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are important to an acceptable representation and apportionment arrangement." 77 The Court thus distinguished between line-drawing to "minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party" and political fairness that entails providing "a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State."
78
The Court's later decisions striking down district maps under the one-person, one-vote rule appear to have been driven by partisan gerrymandering concerns unrelated to population equality. In some cases, the Court upheld maps despite unequal populations, holding that states could legitimately vary from a strict one-person, one-vote standard in order to "maintain[] the integrity of political subdivision lines" 79 or achieve "a rough approximation of the statewide political The nobly aimed 'one-man, one-vote' principle is coming into increasing use as a weapon for state legislators bent on partisan gerrymandering.
From California to New Jersey and points in between, Republicans and Democrats alike are justifying highly partisan remaps by demonstrating respect for the 1964 Supreme Court mandate that population of congressional districts within states must be made as equal as possible.
Meanwhile, other interests at stake in redistricting-such as the preservation of community boundaries and the grouping of constituencies with similar concerns-are being brushed aside. . . . The emphasis on one-man, one-vote not only permits gerrymandering, it encourages it. In many states, it is impossible to approach population equality without crossing city, county and township lines. Once the legislature recognizes that move must be made, it is only a short step further to the drawing of a line that dances jaggedly through every region of the state. Local interests, informed that it is no longer legally permissible to draw a whole county congressional map in most states, are far less likely to object than they were in the past. 
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Vol. 48 from a myopic focus on equalizing population without reference to either proportionality or historical boundaries. 86 Or, conversely, it could happen nefariously from a desire to maintain the improprieties of the prior era: legislators could create districts of equal populations that are nonetheless gerrymandered to unfairly favor one party because they ignore historical boundaries. 87 in the courts-seems especially impertinent. Both practices are not merely consequences of constitutionally suspect politics. They are also fundamental causes of it."); see also . See also Karcher, 462 U.S. at 753 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The major shortcoming of the numerical standard is its failure to take account of other relevant-indeed, more important-criteria relating to the fairness of group participation in the political process."); id. at 774 (White, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one can seriously contend that such an inflexible insistence upon mathematical exactness will serve to promote 'fair and effective representation.'"); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973) ("An unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures . . . may submerge these other considerations and itself furnish a ready tool for ignoring factors that in day-to-day operation are important to an acceptable representation and apportionment arrangement.").
87. See, e.g., Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Court, the People, and "One Man, One Vote," in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S 32 (N. Polsby ed., 1971)) ("Logic, as well as experience, tells us . . . that there can be no total sanctuaries in the political thicket, By the 1990s, Samuel Issacharoff recognized that the new, less obvious partisan gerrymanders were as damaging as ever. "Once decisionmakers had internalized the new legal regime," he explained, the one-person, one-vote rule "simply channeled partisan entrenchment efforts into more creative strategies, the development of which was greatly facilitated by the advent of computer technology." 88 Barred from using population differences to achieve their desired result, politicians simply turned to other gerrymandering tactics to secure an irrational difference between the majority party's support among the electorate and its dominance in the legislature. 89 The Court's one-person, one-vote jurisprudence is thus best seen as an outgrowth of the spirit of the pre-Fourteenth Amendment Constitution and the American democratic culture flowing from the document's structure. While on its face, the rule appears to be a else unfairness will simply shift from one form to another." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gordon E. Baker, Quantitative and Descriptive Guidelines to Minimize Gerrymandering, 219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 200, 208 (1973) ("If more specific guidelines to minimize gerrymandering are not forthcoming, then a great democratic principle-one man, one vote-will have degenerated into a simplistic arithmetical facade for discriminatory cartography on an extensive scale."); Engstrom, supra note 85, at 281-82, 285-86, 296 (explaining that computerized mapping programs applying a "one-man, one-vote" standard can create highly discriminatory districts, observing that dissenting members of the Court predicted in various cases that discriminatory districts would result from mechanical application of the standard, and commenting that "the 'gerrymanderer's paradise'" persists because the Court has failed to develop standards that allow it to invalidate discriminatory districts).
In 1969, Justice Harlan correctly observed "that the rule of absolute equality is perfectly compatible with 'gerrymandering' of the worst sort." Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542, 551 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). "A computer may grind out district lines which can totally frustrate the popular will on an overwhelming number of critical issues." Id. Since Justice Harlan made that point, computer technology has made the gerrymanderer's job even easier. "In the 1970's round of reapportionment, some states were barely able to generate a single reapportionment plan in the time allotted to the task." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF Tex. 2004) (Ward, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) ("The parallel danger of a partisan gerrymander is that the representative will perceive that the people who put her in power are those who drew the map rather than those who cast ballots, and she will feel beholden not to a subset of her constituency, but to no part of her constituency at all. The problem, simply put, is that the will of the cartographers rather than the will of the people will govern. As Judge Ward recently wrote, 'extreme partisan gerrymandering leads to a system in which the representatives choose their constituents, rather than vice-versa.'").
92 This Part responds to common arguments attempting to minimize the negative impact of partisan gerrymanders. It shows that each proves unavailing, thereby reinforcing the conclusion that the problem is sufficiently grave to compel judicial intervention.
A. "Everybody Does It, and They Always Have"
Both political parties, this argument runs, gerrymander at every opportunity and have since the country's earliest days. 97 The term "gerrymander" emerged in 1812 "by combining the last name of Elbridge Gerry with the word 'salamander' in order to describe the 'fancied resemblance to a salamander . . . of the irregularly shaped 93 Partisan gerrymanders are not ordinary in the sense that they always happen. Rather, they infect states where they will have the most pernicious effect: enabling one party to dominate despite voter preferences that should produce a significant competitive democratic check on the majority party.
Experts and courts have also recognized that modern gerrymandering is worse than historic examples. 107 As early as 2004, a court pointed to redistricting software that was so sophisticated and powerful that accurate maps that once took months to prepare could be generated in a matter of hours.
108 Gerrymanderers could thus pick and choose among different maps until they found the one that produced their desired partisan result while also according with some traditional districting principles and thus triggering the least suspicion.
In In Vieth, the plurality suggested that courts need not adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims-at least with respect to the Housebecause the Constitution empowered Congress to step into the thicket, as it had in both the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 114 Historically, however, Congress's failure to act in response to unconstitutional state action has led the courts to intervene, not abstain. After imposing an equal-population requirement on the states for decades, Congress abandoned that requirement in the 1930s, and some states allowed district populations to diverge widely. 115 By the 1960s, the Court understood Congress's inaction as a reason to intervene.
116
Similarly today, Congress has not acted for 50 years in the face of repeated concerns that states have used the one-person, one-vote rule to justify new and potentially more harmful partisan gerrymanders.
C. "Only the Legislature Has the Authority to Make the Necessary Policy Decisions on How Best to Apportion Voters"
Justice O'Connor has argued that developing a test to identify partisan gerrymandering would enmesh the courts in policy choices that properly lie within the legislature's realm. 117 For example, she argued that favoring proportionality over partisanship is an important policy choice best left to the legislature. 118 But courts adjudicating gerrymandering claims would not need to make these policy choices. As Part II shows, redistricting efforts that produce legislatures with representatives either (1) from districts defined by historical geographic boundaries or (2) reflecting the percentage of votes cast for each party statewide have been recognized as legitimate.
119 State legislatures may choose either approach without court interference.
By contrast, partisan attempts to unfairly benefit a single party by ignoring both historical geographic boundaries and the statewide vote have never been deemed acceptable.
120
Adjudicating gerrymandering claims would not require courts to make new and controversial policy choices. They need only enforce the choices that flow from our democratic culture and history.
D. "Gerrymandering Is Self-Defeating"
Justice O'Connor has also argued that the courts should not adjudicate gerrymandering claims because the practice is selfdefeating. 121 As a result, she believed that "political gerrymandering is an evil that can[] be checked or cured by the people or by the parties themselves."
122
In order to create dominance in a state where proportionality would not support it, she contended, the legislative majority must weaken some of its safe seats, thus exposing its own incumbents to greater risks of defeat . . . . 122. Id. at 152. "Indeed, there is good reason to think that political gerrymandering is a self-limiting enterprise." Id. See generally BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 151-159 (1984) (discussing party motives for implementing a partisan gerrymander and methods used to create an effective partisan gerrymander).
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123
Given the inherently self-defeating nature of gerrymandering, Justice O'Connor concluded, "each major party presumably has ample weapons at its disposal to conduct the partisan struggle . . . ."
124
Historians can debate whether this view of partisan gerrymandering was accurate in 1986 when Justice O'Connor made the argument. But it is not true today. District line-drawing techniques are more precise and powerful than ever. And the results of the worst gerrymanders after the 2010 census-Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, North Carolina-support the conclusion that the parties using them face little political risk. 123. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152; Schuck, supra note 10, at 1345 ("[T]he dynamics of political competition and party organizations strongly inhibit partisan gerrymanders and are likely to limit their effects when they do occur. Even if they increase the party's seats in the next election, many of those seats will be more competitive and expensive than before, sowing the seeds of the gerrymander's own destruction or ineffectiveness."). Judge Griesbach, dissenting from the lower court decision in Gill, argued that partisan gerrymandering is just one of many perks that a political party receives when it prevails at the ballot box, including control of the legislative agenda and the ability to name committee chairs as well as a majority of each committee's members.
126 "[I]t is largely true that individuals who attempt to gain political advantage through map-drawing," she contended, "are not engaged in foul play or dirty tricks, but are merely using the power the voters have granted them to enact the policies they favor."
127 As she saw it, their intent was not "to 'burden the representational rights of Democratic voters'" or "suppress opposing viewpoints" through district lines that impede "their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats."
128 Instead, she believed, gerrymanderers are merely trying "to create partisan majorities . . . because they honestly believe they will then be able to enact the policies that in their view are best for the state, or nation." 129 Judge Griesbach's understanding of the American democratic culture is, to say the least, bizarre and frightening. Rigging a district map to put a party with a slight majority of the statewide vote-or even one with only minority support-into overwhelming control of the legislature fundamentally differs from the other perks of victory. All the others preserve a democratic check on power. Partisan gerrymandering, by contrast, undermines that check.
The party that appropriately wins control of the legislature obtains the tools necessary to advance its policies. Controlling the legislative agenda and the makeup of committees enables the winning party to make good on its campaign promises. But critically, further election victories will depend on the success of the policies that the party implements. If the enacted agenda differs from what the party's candidates promised during the campaign, or if that agenda turns out to be unpopular, the victorious party in one election would likely lose district unconstitutional because the state legislature announced a racial target that predominated over traditional districting factors).
126. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 938-39 (Griesbach, J., dissenting 
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130
The Wisconsin gerrymander struck down in Gill is a quintessential example. In the first election after the Republican majority took over, Wisconsin voters expressed their apparent dissatisfaction with that party's policies, casting 51.4% of the two-party vote for Democratic candidates. 131 Nevertheless, the Republican party-despite garnering less than 49% of the vote-retained over 60% of the seats in the legislature.
132
A partisan gerrymander is equivalent to wishing for more wishes when a genie grants you three: one need not worry about using the wishes wisely if she has locked up many more. Gerrymandering similarly reduces the need to legislate wisely because it places a thumb on the scale of future elections, insulating the legislative agenda from fair evaluation by structuring districts in a way that makes it extremely difficult to flip control of the legislature, even if the controlling party's agenda is unpopular. The district court in Gill, for example, determined that the map would allow Republicans to maintain a majority with as little as 48% of the vote, while Democrats would need 54% to flip the chamber, an unlikely percentage in a relatively equally divided state.
133
By placing partisan gerrymandering in the same category as setting the legislative agenda, Judge Griesbach imagines a voting culture in which undermining democratic institutions becomes acceptable when a party "honestly believe [s] 135 One party may dominate state A through gerrymanders while state B will be dominated by the opposing party that institutes its own gerrymander. And a decade later, a new census may reverse the parties' roles. It all comes out in the wash. Letting judges stick their uninformed noses into this thicket, the argument runs, will produce more harm than good.
This attitude cheapens the idea of American democracy and the system of checks and balances that compel compromise and the accommodation of shared interests.
136 American democratic culture presumes that a dispersion of viewpoints and interests will guard against the tyranny of factions and compel negotiation. 137 For this reason, the Constitution included three separate constituencies to elect the President, the Senators, and the Members of the House. 137. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (" [T] he smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (explaining that the system of dual sovereignty; the separate of departments within the federal government; and the size of the federal government all work together to ensure deliberation as opposed to dictatorial control by a single faction).
138. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § § 2-3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
determinants of the quality of representative democracy." 139 After all, democracy and the majority rule principle could be satisfied with a single nationwide election. The top vote-getters would receive the seats in the House, and every representative would represent every citizen. But American democracy has never worked that way. As Dixon explained, "from apportionment and districting derive the more personalized and balanced representation features which temper majoritarianism with requirements of deliberation and consensus." A central guiding thread of American constitutional development has been the evolution of a political system in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision . . . . When I say that a group is heard "effectively," I mean more than the simple fact that it makes a noise; I mean that one or more officials are not only ready to listen to the noise, but expect to suffer in some significant way if they do not placate the group, its leaders, or its most vociferous members . . . .
Thus the making of governmental decision is not a majestic march of great majorities united upon certain matters of basic policy. 141 In this sense, American democracy is not about taking power and solidifying it to enhance your ability to enact your favored policies indefinitely. Dahl's view of democracy depends on a system "devised to maximize the likelihood that a variety of interests, rather than a few dominant interests, will be represented formally in the processes of government."
142 This point applies with respect to enabling majorities to run roughshod over minorities. 143 forcefully to gerrymanders that enable minorities to control government or small majorities to have super-majority positions. Gerrymandering pushes democracy in the wrong direction. It solidifies single-party dominance even in potentially competitive areas. If gerrymandering can render most districts safe for the candidate of one party or the other, then "no return whatsoever can be expected from voting . . . [and] it is irrational to make the effort to vote." 144 This may now be the case in the majority of Congressional districts.
145
Even if gerrymandering balances out over some geographic or temporal frame, it undercuts the legitimacy of the American democratic process.
IV. A STANDARD AND A REMEDY
The Supreme Court's Bandemer decision established conclusively that equal-protection limitations on redistricting extended beyond the one-person, one-vote rule. There, six Justices agreed (1) that the equal-population rule was not, on its own, sufficient to prevent harmful partisan gerrymandering and (2) that courts could identify and prohibit unconstitutional line-drawing. 146 As in any equal-protection case, a plaintiff challenging a gerrymander would need to prove both discriminatory intent and effect. 147 Since Bandemer, however, the Court has struggled to articulate a specific standard that could identify unconstitutional gerrymanders, largely because the Justices mistakenly focused on the legislators' partisan desires and the results that follow redistricting.
148
Recognizing that packing a party's voters into a district or cracking those voters across multiple districts can flow from 144 
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149
The key to a workable standard requires a court to focus on whether the district map itself furthers one of the two legitimate redistricting goals. Neither the subjective intent of the legislators nor partisan voting patterns flowing from redistricting should be determinative.
The pursuit of partisanship is not per se unconstitutional. Instead, a court should focus on whether the map objectively disrespected both historic geographical boundaries and proportionality. Only a map producing partisan advantage through packing and cracking that also disrespected both of these legitimate goals would reveal the discriminatory intent and effect required to hold a redistricting plan unconstitutional.
Sections A and B below show how a court would apply the intent and effect elements of the proposed test. Section C then proposes a remedy for cases in which the plaintiff has proven an equalprotection violation.
A. Discriminatory Intent
A court should adjudicate the intent prong of a partisangerrymandering challenge by objectively determining whether the district lines satisfy one of the two legitimate goals.
150 So long as the population of each district is reasonably equal, any map objectively respecting historical boundaries or proportionality would be immune from an equal-protection challenge. The legislators drafting such a map would have had a rational basis for it, and the plaintiff would thus fail to establish the intent prong of an equal-protection challenge. The 149. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289-90 (plurality opinion). 150. Districts that respect historical boundary lines should not be confused with "compact districts." Although compactness may often be a feature of districts that respect historical boundaries. Historical boundaries may be irregular and noncompact. And districts drawn to be compact may disrespect historical boundaries and thus constitute an improper gerrymander. See Vieth, 541 U.S at 308-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (explaining that even compact districts may produce partisan effects).
court would not need to examine the effects flowing from the map, because effects alone cannot violate the Equal Protection Clause. 151 But if an objective analysis of the map reveals that the legislature ignored the legitimate goals-or treated them as obstacles to be overcome to achieve single-party dominance-then the requisite discriminatory intent would be shown. For example, if a legislature drew oddly shaped districts, it would be ignoring the legitimate goal of creating compact districts. Similarly, if a legislature drew compact districts-but ones that did not track historical city or county boundaries-it would be treating a legitimate goal as an obstacle. Legislatures cannot claim a rational basis for disrespecting the legitimate goals of redistricting in order to obtain an illegitimate result.
Approaching the gerrymandering issue from the perspective of whether the legislature disrespected legitimate goals, the map itself would reveal much of the information necessary to assess the intent prong. It either largely respects historical boundaries, or it does not. It either seeks proportional representation or it does not. Additionally, the policy choice about which goal to pursue is a decision for the state legislature, not a court. But if the redistricting map does not respect either goal, the burden would shift to the state legislature to justify the map.
A state legislature may justify deviations from historical boundaries or proportionality by showing that they were necessary to (1) obtain districts of roughly equal population 152 or (2) avoid violating the Voting Rights Act. 153 If the legislature attempts to justify a map in this way, the burden would fall to the plaintiff to present an alternative map that better adhered to the policy choice made by the legislaturehistorical boundaries or proportionality-while also satisfying the other legitimate requirements on which the state legislature purported to rely. established in the State." 156 As to equal-population redistricting, the Court has granted states considerable leeway when they seek to further legitimate goals, making it relatively straightforward for a court to determine whether deviations from historical boundaries were necessary or driven by partisanship. 157 Much of the debate over the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims has assumed that the one-person, one-vote rule is a readily administered standard, while partisan gerrymandering necessarily involves more subjective decision-making and the balancing of interests. 158 But that distinction is overplayed. As the one-person, one-vote jurisprudence makes clear, no bright line exists as to how close a state must come to equalizing population.
159
Deviations are permitted for the same reasons that states may stray from historical boundaries, and the ultimate decisions have tended to turn on judgment calls as to whether a redistricting map constituted a good-faith effort or a partisan gerrymander. 160 With modern computer-assisted mapping techniques, plaintiffs and the courts can assess whether a map pursues historical boundaries as readily as whether it equalizes population. As Justice Kennedy has recognized, constantly improving software "would facilitate court efforts to identify" maps pursuing legitimate goals and those constituting partisan gerrymanders. 161 Whitford v. Gill provides an illustrative example. 162 There, the legislature generated multiple maps producing compact districts of roughly equal population. 163 But rather than select a map that hewed Vol. 48
closely to historical boundaries, the voting-district drafters chose a map that divided more counties than any districting map in the state's history. 164 And instead of choosing to respect statewide vote totals, the majority party in the legislature used statistical predictions to choose a map that would produce radically disproportional results. 165 Choosing that map revealed the drafters' requisite intent to discriminate: to achieve an illegitimate goal for which no legitimate rational basis existed.
166

B. Discriminatory Effect
If-but only if-a plaintiff has satisfied the intent prong of the equal-protection analysis by showing that the map disrespects both legitimate redistricting goals, it would then need to show discriminatory effect. It must prove that one party dominated the legislature significantly beyond the level that either its statewide vote total or adherence to historical geographic boundaries would be expected to produce. Notably, the Bandemer Court held that a single set of election results was not in and of itself enough to show discriminatory effect. 167 A plaintiff is required to show either the results of at least two elections or statistical analysis of likely future voting patterns. 168 Recall that, if disproportional results would legitimately flow from respecting historical boundaries, the test proposed here would require the court to dismiss the case at the intent stage. Given this refined intent analysis, a plaintiff's burden at the effects stage need not be onerous. A plaintiff can prevail by presenting evidence of results from at least one election showing significant disproportionate representation for one party combined with statistical voting-pattern analysis showing that similar results are likely in the future. Once again, Gill provides a helpful example. There, the plaintiff presented evidence that a party with roughly 50% of the statewide two-party vote held over 60% of the seats in the legislature for two consecutive elections. 170 In addition, the plaintiff presented statistical analysis showing that the party controlling the redistricting would hold its majority with as little as 48% of the statewide vote, while the other party would need 54% to take a majority of the seats, a percentage rarely reached by one party in the state's history. 171 That showing would be sufficient to establish discriminatory effect.
C. A Proposed Remedy
To summarize the standard proposed above, a court should engage in the familiar two-step inquiry into discriminatory intent and effect as it would for any equal-protection challenge. What is new here is that each step would be grounded in objective analysis. First, the court would examine the redistricting map to determine whether it objectively demonstrates that the legislature pursued one of the two legitimate goals: (1) historical-boundary-based district voting; or (2) proportionality between the percentage of voters who cast ballots for a party statewide and the percentage of representatives from that party in the legislature. Only if the map demonstrates disrespect for both legitimate redistricting goals would the court proceed to the discriminatory effect element. And it would analyze the effect element by comparing actual election results and statistical evidence of likely future results with the results that would be obtained with a map that more closely followed historical boundaries.
A successful plaintiff under this standard would receive a twostep remedy. First, the minority party should be given a seat at the redistricting table, and the legislature should be charged with redrawing the problematic map through a bipartisan process. 172 Given the speed with which modern computer software can generate redistricting maps, the parties should be able to complete this task in 172. See DIXON, supra note 84, at 384 (building bipartisanship into the reapportionment process "can be an important guarantee of fairness").
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Vol. 48 short order. Independent line-drawing commissions in many states and the English Boundary Commission employ software-based tools that draw district maps to follow historical boundaries as closely as possible without employing partisan tactics. 173 When a court charges two political parties with the duty to produce a map agreeable to both sides, these non-partisan tools should enable the legislature to generate an even-handed map. 174 Alternatively, a state found to have violated the Equal Protection Clause should be given the option to create a bipartisan redistricting commission. This process has produced positive results in a number of states, 175 and thus it should be open to those who violated the Constitution.
If the parties cannot agree on a bipartisan map within a short period of time, and the state does not create a bipartisan commission to redistrict, the state legislature should be required to select which policy it wishes to pursue: historical boundaries or proportionality. Each party to the case should then be required to submit a map that pursues the state's chosen policy while comporting with both the oneperson, one-vote rule and the Voting Rights Act. The court would then use modern software to select which of the two proposed maps best achieves the state's chosen redistricting goal.
V. CONCLUSION
A path to administrable standards in partisan gerrymandering cases emerges once one recognizes that districting to block communities of voters from meaningfully participating in the political process is equally bad whether it comes in small doses or large ones. Asking how much of a bad thing is too much is the wrong question. Instead, a coherent standard to assess partisan gerrymandering claims requires a clear articulation of the redistricting considerations that are permissible and those that are impermissible. When a map objectively reveals that a legislature pursued a legitimate goal, the court can dismiss the case. Partisan effects may flow from that choice, but they are legitimate because the legislature had a rational basis for its redistricting choices.
But when the legislature has disrespected the legitimate goals to produce a disproportionate result in its favor, however, the courts should not hesitate to step in and declare unfair partisan gerrymandering unconstitutional. A remedy that leaves the linedrawing responsibility largely in the hands of the legislature is readily achievable with modern computer-line-drawing techniques.
The stakes are too high for courts to simply look away. The danger of losing the heart of American democracy is real. Robust twoparty government has been far from a universal rule in American society. American history has seen long stretches of single-party dominance in particular geographic areas.
176
In our current day, Republicans dominate the South and Great Plains while Democrats dominate the Northeast and the West Coast. This tendency toward one-party rule must be tempered by the vigilant pursuit of fairness in apportionment and redistricting to allow a meaningful public assessment of government policy. Without that vigilance, voters in the minority may conclude that their vote is useless, and thus the expense and inconvenience of participating in the democratic process-not just the act of voting, but also educating themselves on the candidates and the relevant issues-is not worth the candle.
177
"The ordered working of our Republic, and of the democratic process," Justice Kennedy has correctly observed, "depends on a sense of decorum and restraint in all branches of government, and in the citizenry itself. . . . [O] 
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abandoned." 178 The test and remedy proposed here seek to restore that sense of decorum without trampling on the legislature's ability to make legitimate redistricting policy choices.
